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Current Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) in a typical enterprise or campus network are limited
by having a number of static monitoring points and static IDS resources deployed. The monitoring
points are typically deployed using hardware optical taps or span ports which are directly fed into the
IDS. The IDS system is a compute resource requiring dedicated-server-grade hardware, and these are
statically configured when installing the network for an enterprise or campus.
We designed a framework for making a distributed elastic Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for a
Software Defined Network (SDN) capable network, called Distributed Elastic Intrusion DeTECTion
(DEIDtect). We combine the flexibility of SDN and the elastic resource usage of a cloud infrastructure
with a DEIDtect orchestrating controller to achieve an elastic IDS framework. DEIDtect enables
simple and more dynamic management of IDS systems. The flexibility of our approach also enables
new IDS use cases and deployment strategies.
For my Mom, Dad, Sister, and Friends
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Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDS/IPS) are widely deployed as critical tools in
the toolkit of security professionals. For example, among the open source IDS/IPS systems, Snort
boasts millions of downloads and approximately 400,000 registered users, while it is estimated that
as many as 10,000 organizations make use of Bro [1, 25]. Despite its widespread use, current
IDS/IPS deployments are plagued by a number of practical concerns that limit their utility. First,
the compute and network resources required to effectively run an IDS/IPS often present problematic
cost versus functionality tradeoffs: Compute requirements for an IDS/IPS system vary over time,
depending on the volume of traffic and the type of analysis that security personnel are performing.
For example, a developing security event might require more detailed deep packet inspection, which
would demand running an IDS/IPS instance configured for this purpose. In practice this results
in two undesirable options: Either compute resources are deployed to accommodate anticipated
peak requirements, leading to over provisioning during off-peak times; or more typically, compute
resources are knowingly underprovisioned. Underprovisioning results in a loss of visibility during
peak times, which, in instances like a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, might be when
intelligence is most needed.
Network requirements for IDS/IPS deployment involve a tap point in the network infrastructure
and sufficient capacity from the tap point to the compute resources hosting the IDS/IPS. A network
tap is typically realized using an optical splitter or, in smaller deployments, a switch span/monitoring
port. Both approaches are highly inflexible: Once deployed, monitoring is constrained to the chosen
tap location, which is typically deployed at the ingress/egress point of a campus or enterprise network.
The implication is that intrusions that remain within the enterprise network might go undetected.
A more fundamental concern is that current IDS/IPS deployments are typically strictly local
concerns. (This remains true in practice despite various earlier efforts towards distributed intrusion
detection systems [14, 17, 29].) Specifically, while security professionals at different organizations
readily exchange intelligence through personal communication, there is no systematic way to follow
a lead to a remote location to investigate the potential source of an attack. Furthermore, it is typically
2not possible to utilize remote expertise or resources to investigate a local problem.
A final concern is the fact that managing an IDS/IPS system is quite complex. For example,
setting up a small scale Snort/Bro instance is a well-documented activity, typically well within reach
for a competent system administrator. However, performing the same activity to scale to campus
or enterprise environments quickly becomes a significant engineering challenge [20]. Furthermore,
systems like Bro provide more flexibility, customization, and analysis capabilities. However, it is
significantly more involved to set up and requires ongoing management by domain experts.
We argue that the inflexibility associated with the compute and network resources needed for
IDS/IPS is the root cause for these concerns and prevents rich cross-domain security models and
investigation.
Combining the flexibility of SDN and the elastic resource usage of a cloud infrastructure with a
DEIDtect orchestrating controller, we achieve an elastic IDS framework.
The initial design work of DEIDtect was presented at the ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Dis-
tributed Cloud Computing (DCC) 2014 and titled “DEIDtect: Towards Distributed Elastic Intrusion
Detection” [27].
1.1 Thesis Statement
Our thesis is that Software Defined Network (SDN) and Cloud Technology will be used to create
a framework which has flexible network monitoring and elastic Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
deployment with cross-domain capability, enabling new IDS use cases.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
• We present the DEIDtect architecture which provides a distributed elastic framework for cross-
site security functions.
• We present a detailed design of the networking component of DEIDtect which involves: (i)
SDN primitives for safely tapping arbitrary traffic at arbitrary locations in an enterprise net-
work, (ii) cloud abstractions for the precise distribution of traffic in a cloud environment, (iii) a
number of interdomain SDN interactions, including security specific intersite communication.
• We present the implementation of our design and evaluate it in an emulated multiple-enterprise
SDN site environment and a real Cloud environment.
• We present the tap traffic management feature of DEIDtect framework, which rate-limits tap
traffic dynamically based upon the service traffic rate and, also whitelists tap traffic based upon
the IDS Virtual Machine Feedback. It also scales the IDS systems in the cloud based upon the
IDS Virtual Machine (VM) processor usage. This is called Adaptive Load Balancing (ALB).
3• We evaluate ALB in both local and distributed deployment of DEIDtect to show how (1) the
tap traffic is controlled at different service traffic rates, (2) how Whitelisting cuts down the drop
rate of the tunnel traffic, and (3) the IDS will be scaled up based upon the IDS Virtual Machine
(VM) processor usage.
1.3 Thesis Overview
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. We describe the DEIDtect architecture and design
in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 details the use cases of DEIDtect. Chapter 4 covers all the work related to
DEIDtect. The implementation of the DEIDtect is detailed in Chapter 5, followed by the evaluation
in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7 we talk about the challenges faced in building the DEIDtect framework
prototype, along with the future work. Chapter 8 concludes this thesis.
CHAPTER 2
DEIDtect ARCHITECTURE AND DESIGN
2.1 Overview
In this chapter, we present the DEIDtect architecture and design methodology. The DEIDtect
framework addresses the fundamental security deployment concerns by exploiting software-defined
networking and cloud computing. The DEIDtect approach effectively enables decoupling of the
location of the network being monitored/protected and the location of the security tools performing
security functions. The DEIDtect approach also enables rapid scaling of security resources during a
security event. This flexibility provides the opportunity to explore new distributed network security
functionality and potentially enable better visibility and coordination among partnered organizations.
2.1.1 DEIDtect Dynamic and Comprehensive Network Tapping
DEIDtect exploits SDN functionality to allow the network and system administrators to tap at
any point in the network, and feeds the tapped traffic stream to the security collectors and analyzers.
Though limited to the bandwidth of the aggregate links, administrators can implement tap points
rapidly at arbitrary points in the network. With a fully instrumented network, administrators can
deploy taps anywhere at the access edge, distribution, core, or internet border. With a partially
instrumented network, administrators can leverage SDN taps in a flexible manner and optical taps
and SPAN/mirror ports at traditional key areas. DEIDtect also allows fine-grained tapping of specific
traffic.
2.1.2 DEIDtect Elastic Security Compute Platform
The DEIDtect approach allows security and network administrators to leverage cloud resources
to create virtual or ‘bare metal’ images of security tools. DEIDtect adds the capability to the normal
cloud orchestration architecture to create the virtual image and to create a network path from the
border of the cloud to the specific host with the security image. By leveraging this technique,
DEIDtect can balance tapped traffic flows across multiple security images quickly in order to scale.
52.1.3 DEIDtect Distributed Network Security Functions
DEIDtect’s flexible resource usage enables distributed network security functions. One possible
scenario could involve a cloud vendor or a large entity, such as a university, company, or government
with a large private internal cloud, offering elastic cloud-based security functions to internal or
external customers. Assuming a fully DEIDtect-enabled network and cloud, i.e., DEIDtect controlled
SDN in both enterprise and cloud, internal customers can be readily served by dynamically exposing
selected tap points to cloud-based security tools. Serving external customers will be possible by
similarly deploying DEIDtect technology in the customer network and utilizing wide-area SDN
infrastructure (or at least semistatic predefined circuits) between the customer network and the cloud
location.
Another scenario might involve a university or company with a number of remote sites, i.e., small
campus sites, field stations or clinics. With the current set of security tools, security administrators
rarely have the ability to deploy tap infrastructure with a dedicated feed into the central campus
security tool suite. With a DEIDtect-enabled network and cloud, this scenario becomes feasible.
A corollary scenario might involve a university or entity that has “sister” sites or smaller campuses
with a tight business, academic, research, or healthcare association. These discrete sites may wish
to leverage common computational resources, security tools, or expertise. This arrangement would
allow for greater visibility into emerging security concerns, thus providing a foundation for detecting
more subtle attacks.
2.2 DEIDtect Architecture
DEIDtect exploits two current trends, namely, the increased use of cloud computing technologies
to consolidate compute resources and the increasing deployment of software-defined networking
(SDN) technology in enterprise, cloud, and wide area networks. DEIDtect uses cloud computing
resources to flexibly and efficiently deal with the computing needs of security tools, like IDS and
IPS, while SDN is utilized to flexibly and safely tap and distribute network traffic between monitored
networks and IDS/IPS instances.
A high-level view of DEIDtect architecture is depicted in Figure 2.1. The figure shows three
campus or enterprise networks, i.e., Sites A, B, and C, of which sites A and C also have their own
cloud computing platforms. The different sites are interconnected via a wide-area network (WAN).
For ease of exposition, we assume that all networks in question are SDN enabled, although hybrid
deployments, e.g., with static or dynamic WAN circuits, would certainly be feasible. We note that
the sites could be distributed locations of the same institution, such as a university, or they could
be associated with different organizations that have a collaboration or business arrangement to work



















Figure 2.1: DEIDtect Architecture
Given this underlying physical infrastructure, DEIDtect architecture involves DEIDtect systems
deployed at each site. As shown in Figure 2.1, the DEIDtect system at each site is involved with
five types of interactions. DEIDtect interacts with: (1) The campus or enterprise network to realize
network taps and to transfer tapped traffic towards the IDS/IPS systems in the cloud infrastructure.
(2) The cloud computing platform to realize IDS/IPS instances and to manipulate the distribution of
tapped traffic towards these instances. (3) The IDS/IPS instances in the cloud to control their intrusion
detection and prevention functionality. (4) Remote DEIDtect systems to request and manipulate
cloud, network, and IDS/IPS resources at remote sites. (5) The wide-area network to realize intersite
connectivity.
2.2.1 DEIDtect System
A system level view of DEIDtect is depicted in Figure 2.2. At the center of the system is the DEI-
Dtect Core Module, which interacts with and orchestrates actions across other system components.
Specifically, as shown in Figure 2.1 and described earlier, the Core Module interacts with five other
components in the system: (1) the Enterprise SDN Network to create tap points in the network and
to deliver monitored traffic to the cloud, (2) the Cloud Computing Platform to instantiate cloud-based
IDS/IPS instances and to route traffic from the network to the appropriate IDS/IPS instance, (3) the
instantiated IDS/IPS instances to orchestrate intrusion detection and prevention, (4) remote DEIDtect
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Figure 2.2: DEIDtect System
tapped network traffic between distributed locations.
Figure 2.2 also shows how DEIDtect components (shaded boxes) integrate with existing systems,
specifically the cloud computing platform and the enterprise SDN network. As shown in the figure,
a DEIDtect Network System module associated with the enterprise SDN network allows DEIDtect
to tap the enterprise network. Similarly, the DEIDtect Cloud System module allows DEIDtect to
distribute tapped traffic to appropriate IDS/IPS instances in the cloud.
2.3 DEIDtect Network System Module
We assume that the enterprise network in question is SDN enabled and specifically supports
OpenFlow version 1.1 (or higher). Figure 2.3 shows a more detailed view of the submodules, which
is composed in DEIDtect Network System module. It consists of (a) SafeTap module to safely tap
arbitrary network traffic at arbitrary points in the network, (b) Bandwidth Monitor module to calculate
the real time usage of the tap ports, (c) White Listing module to install drop rules based upon the
feedback from the IDS and (d) Rate Limiter module to increase/decrease the rate of tap traffic being
sent from the port based upon the current rate of service traffic at that port. This will be discussed in
more detail in the coming sections.















Figure 2.3: DEIDtect Enterprise Network Modules
in the network without impacting existing traffic flows. Further, tapped traffic needs to be transpar-
ently transported to the cloud platform for processing by the IDS/IPS. Transparent transportation of
tapped traffic in DEIDtect is achieved by adding a tunneling tag (e.g., a VLAN tag) to tapped traffic
at the tap switch, and by routing the tagged traffic to the cloud platform. DEIDtect takes advantage
of the multitable functionality available in OpenFlow version 1.1 (or higher) to achieve safe tapping.
Specifically, for flows to be tapped, the normal (existing) flow entry is augmented so that in addition
to the existing flow actions, the flows are also routed to an IDS-specific flow table, which adds the
tunneling tag and forwards the packet towards the cloud platform.
Figure 2.4 shows a single-switch tapping example. The top part of the figure shows an existing
flow entry that forwards packets received on port 5 out on port 3. The bottom part of the figure shows
the modified existing flow entry which continues to output packets on port 3, but also copies the
packet for processing to the IDS table goto IDS table. The IDS table entry, in turn, adds a VLAN tag
and sends the packet out on port 2 to complete the tapping action.
Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code associated with flow table manipulation to realize tapping.
The egressSafeTap function applies the safe-tap flow modification for the specified switch and out
port to be monitored. The algorithm goes through all the tables in the switch and finds all the flows
which have the specified out port in its action field. It then adds the goto IDS table instruction in
the flow to create a copy of packets, and creates a flow in the IDS table with the same match and
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Figure 2.4: DEIDtect: Flow Tables Modification
path to send towards the IDS in the cloud. The flows created in the IDS table are associated with a
rate-limiting meter entry created for the specified port for rate limiting the tap traffic. The intermediate
switches in the computed path are installed with pass-through flows for the newly created VLAN, and
packets are forwarded towards the IDS in the cloud. This basic approach can be readily extended to
allow more specific traffic to be delivered to the IDS by specifying more refined match instructions in
the IDS table flows.
2.3.1 Adaptive Load Balancing (ALB)
The installation of a ‘tap point’ is referred to as a monitoring instance. The monitoring instance
is comprised of the Enterprise network flows installed in each of the switches and the Cloud instance
associated with the ‘tap point’. The DEIDtect safe tapping is done using the same network as the
network services of the Enterprise network, following a shared network approach to send the ‘tap
traffic’ to the IDS instance. In order to handle the rate of tap traffic being delivered, DEIDtect requires
the following complementary approaches: (1) decrease/increase the traffic sent from network to the
IDS (Adaptive Rate Limiting), (2) increase the number of IDS instances to handle the increased traffic
load (Adaptive IDS Scaling).
Adaptive Load Balancing (ALB) is comprised of the following mechanisms. (1) ALB rate-
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Algorithm 1 Tap flow table manipulation
1: procedure EGRESSSAFETAP(tapTable, srcSwitch, srcPort, dstSwitch, flowLabel)
2: path← findPath(srcSwitch, dstSwitch)
3: while node in path do
4: if node == srcSwitch then
5: flowEntries← srcSwitch[Table = ALL]
6: for i, 1→ n do
7: if flowEntries[i].action[output] == srcPort then
8: meterID ← create mete(drop band) . rate-limiting TAP flow





13: else if node == dstSwitch then







limiting to increase or decrease the tap traffic rate as per the service traffic rate, (2) ALB-Whitelisting
creates a drop rule for a flow in the tap traffic which is classified as normal traffic by the IDS, (3)
ALB-IDS scaling which creates more IDS VM to handle more traffic for analysis.
The ALB-Rate-limiting and Whitelisting are explained using Figure 2.5. As shown in Fig-
ure 2.5 (a), there are many monitoring instances installed, highlighted in different colors. Higher
number of monitoring instances cause the links to get congested quickly, causing the Enterprise
service disruptions labeled as ”Congestion” in the figure which is depicted as thick lines to show
higher tap-traffic rate. DEIDtect ALB-Rate-limiting runs in a periodic way to adjust the tap traffic
rate and ALB-Whitelisting controls the congestion of the IDS traffic from the IDS feedback. The IDS
executing in the Cloud platform (1) sends feedback to DEIDtect with the Whitelisting traffic and the
current load on the IDS instance. This is processed by the DEIDtect controller which (2) installs the
appropriate drop rules in the enterprise network. Figure 2.5 (b) illustrates the resulting reduction in
bandwidth usage of the Enterprise network after ALB takes place, which is labeled as ”Congestion
Free”, depicted as thin lines to show reduced tap-traffic rate.
2.3.1.1 ALB - Adaptive Rate Limiting
The DEIDtect has the flexibility to install many monitoring instances in the Enterprise network.






































Figure 2.5: DEIDtect: Adaptive Load Balancing
instance allocates only a portion of the network bandwidth using the OpenFlow Metering feature,
and makes sure that there is no impact on existing service traffic. The monitoring instance traffic rate
is set as per the current traffic rate in the ‘tap point’, subtracting the monitoring instance metering
value, and the new value is calculated based upon Algorithm 2.
2.3.1.2 Additive Increase and Multiplicative Decrease - Link
Sharing
The algorithm monitors the bandwidth usage at each of the monitoring ports, and if the usage
is between threshold min and threshold max percentage, the meter table’s rate limit is reduced in a
multiplicative way, and if it is less than threshold min, the rate limit of the meter table is increased in
an additive way. This allows the service traffic to be forwarded without impact. The additive increase
and multiplicative decrease approach was inspired by the TCP congestion control Algorithm [9]. We
have used this approach to have fairness in the link sharing between service and tap traffic. And
also we want to be cautious about increasing the tap traffic rate, which can disrupt the service traffic.
Hence we have followed the Additive Increase and Multiplicative Decrease model.
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Algorithm 2 Adaptive Traffic Reduction - Rate Limiting
1: procedure RATELIMIT(switch,meterID, bandwidth, usedBW, percentageInc)
2: maxRateLimit← bandwidth/2 . 50% of the bandwidth
3: rateInc← bandwidth ∗ percentageInc
4: rateLimit← OF.getMeterConfig(switch, meterID) . Openflow query to get meter drop
limit
5: if threshold min ≤ usedBW ≥ threshold max then
6: newLimit← rateLimit/2 . Multiplicative Decrease
7: else
8: if rateLimit = maxRateLimit then
9: return . Do nothing
10: end if
11: newLimit← rateLimit+ rateInc . Additive Increase




16: OF.meterMod(switch, meterID, newLimit)
17: end procedure
2.3.1.3 ALB - Whitelisting
This metering table rate-limiting feature drops the packet as per the switch implementation and
hence we do not have any control over how the packet is dropped. But DEIDtect can reduce tap traffic
volume in a smarter way. The ‘tap traffic’ for each monitoring instance is comprised of both normal
and abnormal traffic. Since we have the IDS, it is possible to identify the normal traffic. The normal
traffic identification is supported by most of the IDSes, and this is used by DEIDtect to accomplish
the way the traffic is dropped in the Enterprise network for the monitoring instance. The IDS is
configured to send drop request to DEIDtect to drop selected normal traffic at the ‘tap point’ which
ensures that the packets which go past the rate-limiter are part of the abnormal traffic rather than the
normal/whitelist traffic. This is referred to as traffic Whitelisting. The pseudo-code to facilitate the
traffic throttling via Whitelisting is given in Algorithm 3.
The algorithm installs a drop rule with the traffic type in the safe tapping IDS table, as in Fig-
ure 2.4, which results in unwanted traffic being dropped before the metering could be applied. Drop-
ping packets in this manner at the tap point ensures that only nonwhite-listed traffic is being sent to
the IDS. These Whitelisting drop rules are set with a timeout to resume normal operation again, and
Algorithm 3 Adaptive Traffic Reduction - Whitelisting
1: procedure WHITELISTTRAFFIC(switch, whitelist type)
2: InstallDropRule(switch,table=tapTable,
match=(whitelist type), timeout = safeTapTimeout) . configurable timeout
3: end procedure
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if the IDS picks up the whitelist traffic again, the drop rules are installed. This timeout is to make sure
that the drop rule does not cause the traffic type to forever remain whitelisted.
2.4 DEIDtect Cloud System Module
We assume that the enterprise network in question is SDN enabled. The DEIDtect Cloud System
module has the following functionality: (1) to create an IDS instance for a monitoring instance, (2) to
deliver the traffic from the cloud gateway to the associated IDS instance, and (3) to increase/decrease
IDS instances associated with monitoring instance. Figure 2.6 shows the module level details of
DEIDtect Cloud System: (a) DEIDtect Cloud Controller module to create the IDS instance, (b)
DEIDtect Cloud Network module to create tunnel path for the tap traffic, and (c) DEIDtect ALB
IDS scaling module to scale up/down the number of IDS instances based upon the VM processor
usage.
DEIDtect Cloud System module creates an IDS VM with Whitelisting and cpu usage reporting
configuration using the DEIDtect Cloud Controller module. DEIDtect Cloud Network module sets
up the tap traffic delivery by finding the topology of the cloud network and finding the shortest path
between the cloud gateway and the IDS instance, and installing the required flows. The flow instal-
lation procedure checks for existing flows and splits the traffic at the lowest possible subtree. This
also takes into consideration that the Virtual Machine’s (VM) existing traffic must not be disrupted.
DEIDtect ALB-IDS scaling monitors the IDS usage and scales up/down the number of IDS instances
to handle the traffic for the associated monitoring instance. The Whitelisting request from the IDS are
DEIDtect System Cloud Module
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Figure 2.6: DEIDtect Cloud System Modules
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sent to the DEIDtect Core module and that delegates it to the associated DEIDtect Network module
in local/remote site based upon the monitoring instance information.
As described in Section 2.2, the DEIDtect Cloud System module forms part of and extends the
functionality of an SDN-capable cloud computing platform. We abstracted DEIDtect Cloud Network
System module functionality into a higher level API that a cloud control architecture would expose
to allow DEIDtect to orchestrate cloud network functionality:
1. createTrafficRoute(tunnel id, traffic type, VM instance) tells the cloud controller to create an
isolated tunnel flow between the cloud gateway switch and the VM instance. Traffic tagged with
tunnel id in the cloud gateway, with the particular traffic type delivered to the VM instance.
2. removeTrafficRoute(tunnel id, VM instance) removes all the flow entries which were installed
for createTrafficRoute API for the particular VM instance identified by the tunnel id.
3. removeAllRoutes(VM instance) removes all the flow entries associated with that VM instance.
In other words, removes all flows installed for createTrafficRoute API calls, which are associ-
ated with VM instance.
The above given higher level DEIDtect cloud API maps to the lower level API of the Cloud
System module, which is part of the cloud SDN network as shown in Figure 2.2. The lower level API
exposes the following functions:
1. tapTunnelEntry(src switch id, dst switch id, dst port, vlan id): This creates a tunnel from the
source switch to the destination switch with the given vlan id. The dst port specifies the port
which is connected to the VM with respect to the cloud environment, and at the destination
switch the vlan id tag is removed and the traffic is delivered as it is seen by the actual destina-
tion.
2. tapTunnelDelEntry(src switch id, dst switch id, dst port, vlan id): This removes the tunnel
created by tapTunnelEntry.
3. splitTunnelEntry(src switch id, dst switch id, dst port, vlan id, traffic type): This splits the
traffic tagged with vlan id from the source switch and pushes the specified type of traffic type
to the destination switch via the dst port.
4. splitTunnelDelEntry(src switch id, dst switch id, dst port, vlan id, traffic type): This removes
the changes done by splitTunnelEntry.
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2.4.1 ALB - Adaptive IDS Scaling
The traffic rate-limiting and Whitelisting are two of the actions taken by DEIDtect’s ALB. Another
action is the AutoScaling of IDS instances. This is used in scenarios where the bandwidth availability
in the Enterprise Network is sufficient for a monitoring instance but the IDS instance associated
with it gets overloaded by processing all the tapped traffic. The monitoring instance requires more
computing resources to handle the traffic. DEIDtect have the capability to provision such needs of
adding more worker nodes to the IDS cluster architecture as a part of this work. The pseudo-code to
facilitate the auto scale is given in Algorithm 4.
The algorithm increases the number of worker nodes along with the network topology for a cluster
IDS setup if the VM processor utilization is higher than cpu threshold.
Algorithm 4 ALB - Dynamic Auto Scaling
1: procedure AUTOSCALING(TAPID, currentUtilization)
2: if currentUtilization ≥ cpu threshold then
3: nodes← getCloudInstance(TAPID).nodeCount()






Different scenarios enabled by DEIDtect are depicted in Figure 3.1. Figure 3.1 (a) shows the
default case that mimics current common practice. As shown in the figure, an IDS instance is assumed
to be operational in the (general purpose) cloud environment. This IDS is fed by a single tap point
at the network ingress/egress. A key difference between DEIDtect and conventional deployments is
depicted in Figure 3.1 (b), where a security professional, or the system by itself, determines the need
to realize another tap point inside the campus network and create another IDS instance (IDS2) in
the cloud platform to monitor this new tap point. Finally, Figure 3.1 (c) depicts an intersite scenario
whereby another IDS instance (IDS3) is realized in the cloud, and in this case traffic from a network
tap at a remote site is being monitored by the new IDS instance.
The setup in the last scenario accommodates several different use cases. For example, the security
administrator of a remote site may wish to have traffic from its network be analyzed by a more sophis-
ticated setup elsewhere. E.g., site B in Figure 2.1, which does not have its own cloud infrastructure,
might routinely outsource the security functions of its network to sites A or C. Or site C might run
its own Snort instance, but might have a need to perform more detailed analysis using a Bro instance
administered at site A. Alternatively, the security administrator of site A in Figure 2.1 might want to
investigate an attack originating from site B, and since site B does not have a cloud platform to allow
dynamic instantiation of IDS instances, the remote tap traffic is relayed back to site A.
Note that the scenarios illustrated in Figure 3.1 and discussed here are example configurations.
A key strength of DEIDtect is its flexible use and manipulation of distributed resources related to
security which enables many alternative scenarios.
From an SDN perspective the DEIDtect architecture involves several types of inter-SDN domain
interactions. First, within each site the cloud platform and campus network represent two separate
SDN domains. As shown in Figure 3.1 (a), the campus network is directed by an enterprise network
controller to realize the functionality and policies associated with such an environment. The cloud
network, on the other hand, is controlled by a cloud control architecture to realize cloud-specific














































Figure 3.1: DEIDtect Network Functionality
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control and cloud control entities, i.e., across two different domains, to realize distributed elastic
detection. Specifically, this includes creating tapping resources in the campus network, creating
distribution resources in the cloud network, and finally, orchestrating the interconnection of these
resources between the two domains. This is depicted in Figure 3.1 (a), with the solid line intercon-
necting the tap resources in the campus network with the distribution resources in the cloud platform,
respectively depicted as different types of dotted lines.
A similar set of inter-SDN domain interactions are involved with the intersite DEIDtect function-
ality depicted in Figure 3.1 (c). First, the DEIDtect systems in each site need to interact to realize
the required functionality, e.g., setting up a (possibly remote) network tap or instantiating a local
or remote IDS instance. Following these application-specific interactions, DEIDtect again needs to
orchestrate the connection of these sets of resources to realize end-to-end functionality. In this case,
however, the orchestration would typically involve interaction with a network controller responsible
for interconnecting the distributed sites across the WAN.
CHAPTER 4
RELATED WORK
DEIDtect combines cloud computing and software-defined networking across a variety of do-
mains to realize a distributed network security framework. We touch upon the most relevant related
work below.
4.1 SDN in Cloud Networking
The use of OpenFlow to develop a networking infrastructure for the cloud which can support
millions of IP and MAC addresses by virtualizing layer 2 network has been proposed [22] . The
Cloud Broker work [16] uses OpenFlow to connect multiple data centers via flow-based networking.
Support for SDN in the popular OpenStack cloud has also been developed [8]. The Inter-Cloud
Network Gateway [24] provides network control and configuration capabilities over a network of
distributed cloud resources. CloudWatcher [28] uses OpenFlow to provides monitoring services for
large and dynamic cloud networks. In contrast to these works, DEIDtect exposes an SDN cloud
abstraction to allow control of the delivery of network traffic to specific virtual machine instances in
the cloud.
4.2 SDN in Security
SDN has also been used in the context of enterprise security functionality. Microsoft’s De-
mon [12] does the traffic monitoring using OpenFlow but requires hardware to be installed, whereas
the goal of DEIDtect is to avoid the installation of special hardware for monitoring. OpenFlow capa-
bilities have been used for the distribution of traffic load from routers into multiple IDS instances [20].
This approach uses SDN in localized fashion with a static set of IDS resources, lacking DEIDtect’s
network-wide tapping and elastic compute capabilities. Perhaps most related to DEIDtect’s enterprise
and cloud interworking, the use of SDN to enable communication between enterprise and cloud plat-
forms and to enable intercloud workflow is suggested in [7]. DEIDtect realizes a framework to enable
a security-related workflow that spans across distributed cloud and enterprise instances. To enable
the wide-area part of our architecture, DEIDtect also assumes the use of interdomain “stitching”
protocols, either using SDN technology [18] or more conventional dynamic circuit establishment [13].
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DEIDtect also follows in the footsteps of a variety of distributed security efforts over a long
period of time. Dshield [5] is part of the SANS’ Internet Storm Center program, allowing firewall
users to share intrusion detection information so as to analyze and make it publicly available. Snapp et
al. [11] demonstrated a prototype of Distributed IDS (DIDS) that combines distributed monitoring and
data reduction with centralized data analysis (through the DIDS Director). A Distributed Intrusion
Prevention System (DIPS) has been proposed by Sproull et al. [29]. Our work is complementary
to these approaches, focusing on the flexible use of network and cloud resources across different
domains to realize security functions in a distributed setting.
4.3 Scalability of Network Security Tools
The scalability of security tools has been addressed by a number of earlier works. For example,
IDS clusters to improve the scalability of intrusion detection have been proposed [14, 30]. In [14] a
load balancing system is proposed which splits responsibilities of a node to others, replicates traffic
to NIDS clusters and aggregate results to split expensive processing at the NIDS. The NIDS cluster
work [30] realizes highly scalable intrusion detection by running individual IDS instances in a cluster,
exchanging low-level information among instances. With a complete DEIDtect realization we expect
to use similar approaches for the DEIDtect cloud-based IDS instances.
4.4 IDS in Cloud
IDS/IPS in the cloud has been proposed to provide security for cloud tenants [21, 23]. A cooper-
ative IDS network is proposed in [21] to prevent DDOS attacks on the cloud. The integration of an
IDS into a cloud environment was demonstrated using Eucalyptus [23]. The focus of these existing
approaches is on providing cloud security. In contrast, DEIDtect uses the elastic properties of cloud
for the security of enterprise networks.
4.5 SDN - Adaptive Load Balancing
SciPass [6] proposes a reactive approach of installing white-listing flows sent towards Firewall
from IDS response. DEIDtect’s ALB uses the similar approach to realize the throttling feature on
a broader scale rather than at a single point of the network. It is done in a distributed environment




The DEIDtect Core is the heart of DEIDtect framework and is responsible for orchestration of
the DEIDtect Enterprise Controller and DEIDtect Cloud Controller, which dispatches the necessary
actions for adding or removing monitoring instances. It listens for any remote requests to allocate
resources in the local cloud domain, and issues remote request.
5.1.1 DEIDtect Core - Local Tap Work Flow
Figure 5.1 shows the workflow for a local monitoring instance add request handling in DEIDtect.
It also shows all the submodules in each of the domain systems and all the interactions that are done
for a monitoring instance creation.
For a Local Site, the “User Tap Request” to DEIDtect Core initiates a “Create VM” request to
the DEIDtect Cloud System via the DEIDtect Cloud API module. DEIDtect Cloud API requests the
DEIDtect Cloud Helper to create the IDS VM with all the necessary configurations for the Whitelist

































Figure 5.1: DEIDtect Local Tap Request - Work Flow
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traffic by sending requests to the DEIDtect Network Helper and DEIDtect Compute Helper. After
the IDS VM and the tunnel are set up in the Cloud, DEIDtect Core initiates a “Start Tap” request
to the DEIDtect Network System’s Tap Manager submodule. The Tap Manager submodule starts
the Bandwidth Rate Limited request to manage the tap traffic. This completes a single “User Tap
Request.” The IDS VM reports the traffic to whitelist to the DEIDtect Core whenever it detects a
normal traffic flow, which initiates an “Install Drop Rule” to the Whitelist Manager submodule in the
corresponding DEIDtect Network System.
5.1.2 DEIDtect Core - Remote Tap Work Flow
Figure 5.2 shows the workflow for a remote monitoring instance add request handling in DEID-
tect.
In case of a Remote Site, the “User Tap Request” to a DEIDtect Core (remote) initiates a “Remote
Request” to the DEIDtect Core (local) for Cloud Resource allocation. Then the IDS VM creation
follows the same work flow as the “Local User Tap Request.” The DEIDtect Core (local) initiates a
“Create VM” request to DEIDtect Cloud System via DEIDtect Cloud API module. DEIDtect Cloud
API issues a request to the DEIDtect Cloud Helper. DEIDtect Cloud Helper creates the IDS VM
with all the necessary configurations for the Whitelist and CPU usage reporting to the DEIDtect
framework. It also sets up the tunnel for the tap traffic by sending a request to the DEIDtect Network
Helper and DEIDtect Compute Helper. After the IDS VM and the tunnel are set up in the Cloud,
DEIDtect Core (remote) initiates a “WAN tunnel request” to the WAN Controller to setup the tunnel
between the Remote Site gateway node and the Local Site Cloud Network Node, and a “Start Tap”
request to the DEIDtect Network System’s Tap Manager submodule. The Tap Manager submodule
starts the Bandwidth Rate Limited request to manage the tap traffic, which completes a single remote
“User Tap Request.” The IDS VM reports the traffic to whitelist to the DEIDtect Core (local).
Whenever this is detected, this is relayed to the DEIDtect Core (remote). Which in turn initiates
an “Install Drop Rule” to the Whitelist Manager submodule in the corresponding DEIDtect Network
System.
The event graph in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 shows the events that are taking place in each of the
modules of DEIDtect framework to service a single user request for a local and remote site monitoring
instance creation/deletion. The traffic evaluation graph is shown in Sections 6.3 and 6.4.
5.2 DEIDtect Network System
The DEIDtect Network System has been built as a ryu application module. The assumptions and
required configuration are that the ryu controller has the basic simple switch application enabled to








































































































































































































































































requires initial configurations of the hosts connected to the switches and the local/remote gateway
switch to which the tap traffic is to be tunneled. This is used to find out the tunnel path from the
switch where the tap is to be setup to the local/remote gateway switch to which the traffic is to be
delivered. DEIDtect Network System module takes the topology information from a configuration file
along with the connected host, cloud gateway, or remote DEIDtect information. It can be extended to
get the network topology by running the topology discovery application which comes along with ryu
as a native application. This is just to keep things simple in terms of the implementation and does not
change any of the claims made for DEIDtect framework.
The DEIDtect Network System is written as a set of ryu application modules. Figure 5.3, shows
the DEIDtect Network System in a sample Enterprise environment, with its core components shown
in grey boxes (1) Tap Manager - Creates duplicate traffic of specified flows with VLAN tag. (2)
Adaptive Rate Limiter - for rate limiting the tap traffic. (3) Whitelisting Module - Installs drop rules
of whitelist traffic from IDS VM (feedback loop). (4) Bandwidth Monitor - Calculates the bandwidth
usage of the tap port for the Adaptive Rate Limiter module.
5.2.1 ryu-Tap Manager
The ryu Tap-Manager application is the core module responsible for creating the safe tap modifi-
cation of the flows as per the request. The implementation requires initial flows to be present to create
safe tap flows. The tap flow can be installed to monitor an entire port traffic or a specific traffic type on
the specified port of the switch. The module communicates with the DEIDtect Core System module
via the REST interface in public IP space. For each monitoring instance an associated Drop Meter
(OpenFlow metering) is created for rate-limiting the ‘tap traffic’ alone. The meter table serves as the














Figure 5.3: DEIDtect Network System - Enterprise Domain
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is purely switch-dependent, and there is always high chance of losing useful traffic being sent to the
IDS. This will be addressed by the Whitelisting module in the section below. The management of the
Drop Meter is done by the Adaptive Rate Limiter module, explained in the upcoming section.
5.2.2 ryu-Adaptive Rate Limiter
The ryu Adaptive Rate Limiter application comes into play when there is an active monitoring
instance. It runs periodically to check whether the service traffic usage is higher or lower than the
tap traffic usage. Based upon the usage, it either increases the tap traffic rate in case of low service
traffic usage or decreases the tap traffic rate in case of high service traffic usage. The traffic dropped
by the metering is purely switch-based and one does not have any control over the kind of traffic that
is dropped. This is a key factor, as the current IDSes requires all the data possible for proper detection
of intrusions. Hence we have the Whitelisting module as part of DEIDtect Network System module,
which tries to push as much useful ‘tap traffic’ for IDS analysis.
5.2.3 ryu-Whitelisting
The DEIDtect feedback loop from the IDS VM is used to accomplish the Whitelisting of traffic
towards the IDS. This ensures that the traffic being rate-limited by the meter table is useful for the IDS
to detect anomalies. The ryu Whitelisting application has a REST interface which accepts the type
of flow to be dropped for the specified tap port. The feedback loop greatly helps to achieve greater
accuracy of IDS detection in the restricted resource environment of DEIDtect. The Whitelisting
requests are sent by the DEIDtect Core System module as described in the design of the framework,
as the IDS VM cannot directly contact the associated DEIDtect Network System module because of
the different domains they reside in. The Whitelist request from IDS is sent to the DEIDtect Core and
relayed to the DEIDtect Network System if it is a local system or Remote DEIDtect Core instance of
the associated monitoring instance.
5.2.4 ryu-Bandwidth Monitor
The ryu Bandwidth Monitor application is used to poll for switch port statistics to calculate traffic
being sent out on the switch ports. This is used to calculate the amount of service traffic that is being
sent to that port, and the rest of the unused bandwidth can be used to send the tap traffic. Since this
information is only required when there is an active tap port, the bandwidth monitoring is done only
when there is an active monitoring instance.
5.3 DEIDtect Cloud System
The cloud environment being used for DEIDtect is OpenStack [26]. The deployment information
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Figure 5.4: DEIDtect Cloud System - OpenStack
The OpenStack is deployed using the Open-VSwitch plugin to have the SDN environment in
cloud and uses Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) network isolation type. The OpenStack cloud
deployment for DEIDtect Cloud System is shown in Figure 5.4, for which the primary function is
to create/delete IDS VMs in the cloud and create a tunnel from the cloud gateway to the specific
VM created for the tap port. The way it accomplishes this is described in the sections below. The
communication between these modules happen on the OpenStack management network is shown in
Figure 5.5 for keeping the access within the local domain. Only the DEIDtect Cloud Controller can
be accessed by the DEIDtect Core module.
The OpenStack deployment consists of a Cloud Controller Node, a Network Node, and a set
of Compute Nodes, as shown in Figure 5.4. The figure shows only the datapath connection of the
network, but the deployment also has another LAN for the management network, which is not shown.
The DEIDtect Cloud System consists of the DEIDtect Cloud Controller comprising (1) the DEI-
Dtect Cloud API layer to enable external access to the DEIDtect Cloud System APIs (2) the DEIDtect
Cloud Controller Helper to orchestrate the underlying modules to accomplish the tunnel creation/dele-
tion and IDS VM instance creation/deletion, (3) the DEIDtect Cloud Network Helper to add/remove
OpenFlow rules for tunnel creation/deletion in the OpenStack Network Node and (4) the DEIDtect
Cloud Compute Helper to add/remove OpenFlow rules for tunnel creation/deletion in the OpenStack
Compute Node along with iptable rule installations.
5.3.1 DEIDtect Cloud Controller
This is a python module running on the OpenStack Cloud Controller Node which comprises
two sub modules DEIDtect Cloud API layer and DEIDtect Cloud Controller Helper, as show
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Figure 5.5: DEIDtect Cloud System - Communication Path
in Figure 5.4 blocks labeled (1)&(2). The DEIDtect Cloud API layer, in Figure 5.4 (1) is a python
REST API layer for inter module communication. The DEIDtect Cloud Controller module uses
the OpenStack API to manage the instance creation, security group rule management for the IDS,
and interface configurations for it. The DEIDtect Cloud Controller module shown in Figure 5.4 (2)
creates a tunnel path from the OpenStack Network Node to the corresponding OpenStack Compute
Node where the VM is hosted. The OpenStack API provides rich capabilities to find the virtual (not
physical) network path through which the tunnel needs to be created. This is used by DEIDtect Cloud
Controller to install OpenFlow rules to create a tunnel path for tap traffic and modify iptables at the
compute node to allow all traffic to VM. The iptables custom rule is to allow tap traffic to be delivered
to the interface as the destination IP is not the IDS VM’s IP. The DEIDtect Cloud Controller module
(2) communicates with DEIDtect Cloud Network module (3) and DEIDtect Cloud Compute module
(4) to orchestrate the IDS and tunneling.
The IDS VM created has two different virtual network interfaces attached to it, one for VM
access via internet using the floating IP associated with the interface, and the second one for the ‘tap
traffic’ to be delivered to the VM. These two interfaces are part of different virtual networks created
in OpenStack.
The image used by the DEIDtect Cloud Controller to create the VM is preconfigured with BRO
IDS listening on second ethernet interface (eth1). The DEIDtect Cloud Controller also passes on
the cloud-init script to configure the BRO IDS in standalone/cluster mode depending upon the user
request. The cloud-init script is dynamically created as per the request, and it also has the DEIDtect
Network System module IP and the switch Data Path ID (DPID) for the Whitelisting module in the
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VM to send the Whitelisting request to.
The communication between these modules happens over the OpenStack Management network,
making it accessible only within the closed network.
5.3.2 DEIDtect Network Helper
This is a python module, as shown in Figure 5.4 in the block labeled (3), which runs on the Open-
Stack Network Node and has a REST interface listening on the management network of OpenStack.
The OpenStack Network Node has three ovs-bridges br-ex, br-int, br-tun connected via veth pair
bridges called patch-ports as shown in Figure 5.6.
To create the cloud network tunnel for the tap traffic the flows are installed in all the three bridges
which are tagged with the VLAN ‘X’ seen in br-ex, and forwarded to br-int and onto br-tun. The
br-tun has all the GRE port end points connected to all OpenStack Compute Nodes. The GRE out
port is found using the destination IP of the destination OpenStack Compute Node. The VLAN tag
is removed and a tunnel ID ‘Y’ is set to send it via the GRE port. The VLAN is later used in the
OpenStack Compute Node to again recover the traffic after it is obtained from the GRE tunnel port
based on the tunnel ID. So each ‘tap traffic’ requires two distinct IDs, the tunnel ID and VLAN ID as
per the OpenStack’s current design for proper traffic delivery to the VM in the DEIDtect framework.
The OpenFlow rules installed for creating the tunnel to deliver the tap traffic to the Compute Node at
each of the ovs-bridges in the Network Node are shown in Figure 5.7. The deletion of the tunnel is
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Figure 5.7: OpenStack Network Node - OpenVSwitch Under The Hood
5.3.3 DEIDtect Compute Helper
This is again a python module as in the Figure 5.4 block labeled (4), which runs on each of the
OpenStack Compute Node with a REST interface on the management network of OpenStack. The
OpenStack Compute Node has two ovs-bridges br-tun, br-int connected via veth pair bridges called
patch-ports, as shown in Figure 5.8.
As per the request from the DEIDtect Cloud Controller, the openflow rules are pushed to the
br-tun, and br-int. The br-tun consists of all the GRE port end points between OpenStack Compute
Node and OpenStack Network Node. The tunnel rules are installed in br-tun to forward the traffic
of the specified tunnel ID ‘Y’ and add the VLAN ‘X’ back to it and send it to the br-int. The br-int
then pops the VLAN tag and forwards it to the port on which the IDS VM is attached (eth1). The
OpenFlow rules installed for the tunnel traffic delivery to the VM at each of the ovs-bridges in the
Compute Node are shown in Figure 5.9. The deletion of the tunnel is the removal of all the associated
flows in each of the bridges.
The module also installs iptable rules associated with the interface. Though the controller has
created the necessary rules to allow all traffic to the IDS from any sources, the traffic has to be destined
to the IDS. The traffic with a different destination address will not be allowed to get delivered to the
VM. Hence the DEIDtect Compute Helper installs necessary iptables. This ensures that the interface
is put in promiscuous mode and all the tunnel traffic is sent to the IDS without the firewall drops.
Also, the VM’s iptables are to be configured to allow all ingress traffic in the monitoring interface
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Figure 5.9: OpenStack Compute Node - OpenVSwitch Under The Hood
CHAPTER 6
DEIDtect EVALUATION
6.1 Questions answered by this evaluation
These are the questions we answer through this evaluation.
• How easy is it to setup a monitoring instance for a local site and a remote site?
• Does the IDS VM detect the anomalies using the tunnel traffic?
• How is bandwidth of tap traffic being managed at different service traffic rates?
• How does the Whitelisting feature of the framework act based upon Bro script and whitelist
target traffic?
• How does IDS scaling happen at different IDS VM usage?
• What is the impact of traffic rate limiting on IDS detection?
6.2 Experimental Setup
The testbed depicted in Figure 6.1 has been deployed in Emulab [15]. This figure shows the
assumed physical topology. The logical view of the testbed is shown in Figure 6.2. The local
and remote enterprise networks are emulated using Mininet [19] with CPqD [10] software switches.
The testbed comprises (a) Remote Enterprise Network, (b) External node which acts as Wide Area
Network (WAN), (c) Local Enterprise Network, and (d) OpenStack Cloud Environment.
The hardware switches supporting OpenFlow 1.3 protocol which were available for this work
did not support multitable and meter table, which are primary requirements in an enterprise network
environment for DEIDtect deployment. Hence we used the software switch which had the required
features for the enterprise network. The software switch was not used in Emulab nodes, as the
experiments in the testbed were isolated using VLANs, but DEIDtect also requires VLANs for its
isolation. Hence we used Emulab nodes to emulate an enterprise network using Mininet. Mininet has
the capability to attach physical interface bridges to the emulated network switches, which is how the
























Figure 6.1: EMULAB Physical (Datapath) Testbed Topology
The cloud software used for the deployment is OpenStack [26] deployed in Emulab. This is open
source software which integrates OpenFlow-based software-defined networking (SDN), enabling
automation and provisioning of network services. OpenStack deployment for DEIDtect uses the Open
vSwitch plug-in and GRE tunneling network options for isolation. The reason to use GRE tunneling
instead of VxLAN is that the deployment is on top of Emulab. Since Open vSwitch is the only option
available in the OpenStack to enable SDN for network management, DEIDtect implementation could
not have metering support in the Cloud domain. The DEIDtect test-bed’s OpenStack deployment
has (1) a cloud controller node, (2) a network node, (3) three compute nodes connected in two LAN
networks. One of the LANs is for management traffic and the other is for datapath. The network node
is connected to an external node (in OpenStack terms) or WAN controller in the DEIDtect testbed
environment, which is for external internet access to the cloud VMs using floating IPs.
OpenStack manages virtual networks in the Cloud, which is done using Open vSwitch on the
nodes. Figures 5.6 and 5.8 show the bridges created and maintained by OpenStack for virtual network
management for VMs. To deal with scalability issues, recent releases of OpenStack uses an OpenFlow
Agents rather than a centralized controller to install flow entries, create logical ports, and complete
other Open vSwitch operations. Hence OpenStack deployment assumes connectivity between the
different nodes as show in Figure 6.1 “OpenStack Environment.” The current OpenStack does not
have any knowledge about the underlying network device and the topology deployed of the physical
access to the network devices.
Without the details of network topology of the devices in the cloud environment we cannot
implement the tap traffic rate-limiting in the cloud as done in enterprise network with metering.
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DEIDtect Controller (REMOTE)






















































Figure 6.2: DEIDtect Logical Testbed Topology
In a scenario where the same tap traffic is to be delivered to different set of IDS having different
monitoring tasks, the traffic cannot be split at the lowest possible network subtree (to avoid traffic
duplication). Hence the tap traffic management is restricted to the enterprise network domain of
DEIDtect architecture. This is not a limitation of the DEIDtect design but rather of the OpenStack.
The enterprise network node’s gateway link is connected to the OpenStack network node via a
GRE tunnel in case of a local site, as labeled in Figure 6.2. In case of a remote site, the enterprise
gateway GRE link is connected to the external node, which is considered logical Wide-Area Network
(WAN). The WAN controller runs in the external node and the external node is connected to the
OpenStack network node via GRE tunnel.
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6.2.1 Tools Used
For generating UDP traffic, mausezahn (mz) and iperf are used. For Secure Ftp server, very
secure FTP daemon (vsftpd) is used. For traffic monitoring, the Bandwidth Monitor NG (bwm-ng)
tool is used. The CPU usage stats are obtained from th VM using Collection Daemon (collectd).
6.3 DEIDtect End-to-End - Local Tap
This section shows the end-to-end traffic flow when a local tap is created. We evaluate the end-
to-end working of framework for a local tap in the topology shown in Figure 6.3., i.e., a subset of the
evaluation setup shown in Figure 6.2.
6.3.1 Test and Result
The traffic is being monitored at each of the links labeled in Figure 6.3: (a) Service traffic
from Host 1 (H1) towards Host 3 (H3), (b) Service traffic towards Host 3, (c) Tap traffic towards
cloud gateway, (d) Tap traffic received by the OpenStack Network node, (e) Tap traffic sent to the
corresponding IDS VM on the OpenStack Compute Nodes. Figure 6.4 shows the network activity
graph of the labels (a) to (e) seen in Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.4 shows a number of time series events corresponding to the creation of a local tap point
on Switch 1 (S1) to monitor all traffic sent out on port 3 through the topology.
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Figure 6.4: DEIDtect Local Tap Event Graph
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We now describe each event shown in the figure: (1) Traffic sent from H1 to H3. Figure 6.4 (a)
shows the traffic sent from H1. (b) shows traffic received on H3, (2) Create Tap point on S1 port
3, Figure 6.4 (c) shows tap traffic out of the gateway node, (d) shows tap traffic received by the
OpenStack Network Node and (e) shows tap traffic sent to the IDS VM created for the corresponding
tap point.
From the results we can see how the tap traffic is tunneled towards the IDS VM for a local tap by
DEIDtect, as per the workflow in Figure 5.1.
6.4 DEIDtect End-to-End - Remote Tap
This section shows the end-to-end traffic flow when a remote tap is created. We evaluate the
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Figure 6.5: DEIDtect Remote Tap - Topology
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6.4.1 Test and Result
The traffic is being monitored at each of the links labeled in Figure 6.5: (a) Service traffic from
Host 1 (H1) towards Host 3 (H3), (b) Service traffic towards Host 3, (c) Tap traffic towards cloud
gateway, (d) Tap traffic received by the WAN node, (e) Tap traffic received by the OpenStack Network
node, (f) Tap traffic sent to the corresponding IDS VM on the OpenStack Compute Nodes. Figure 6.6
shows the network activity graph of the labels (a) to (f) seen in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.6 shows a number of time series events corresponding to the creation of a remote tap
point on Switch 1 (S1) to monitor all traffic sent out on port 3 through the topology. We now describe
each event shown in the figure: (1) Traffic sent from H1 to H3. Figure 6.6 (a) shows the traffic sent
from H1. (b) shows traffic received on H3, (2) Create Tap point on S1 port 3, Figure 6.6 (c) shows tap
traffic out of the gateway node, (d) shows tap traffic received by the WAN node, (e) shows tap traffic
received by the OpenStack Network Node and (f) shows tap traffic sent to the IDS VM created for
the corresponding tap point.
From the results we can see how the tap traffic is tunneled towards the IDS VM for a remote tap
by DEIDtect, as per the workflow in Figure 5.2.
6.5 DEIDtect Ease Of Use
We illustrate DEIDtect’s ease of use by showing how DEIDtect provides a high-level abstraction
to the underlying tedious process in creating/destroying a monitoring instance.
The creation or deletion of a tap using DEIDtect is done by a single REST request to the DEIDtect
framework.
The general REST request format for the current implementation is shown below.
curl http://{DEIDTECT_IP}:120/deidtect/{add/del}/{IDS VM name}/
{switch DPID}/{port to monitor}/{vlan ID}/{tunnel ID}
This can be further simplified by managing the VLAN, TUNNEL ID and a dynamic tap name
allocation which will require only the create/delete action sent along with the switch name and switch
port to DEIDtect Core. The simplified version in case of managing the IDs and name is shown below.
[Managed] curl http://{DEIDTECT_IP}:120/deidtect/{add/del}/
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Figure 6.6: DEIDtect Remote Tap Event Graph
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6.5.1 Examples
Adding and deleting a monitoring point for DEIDtect running on “155.98.38.103” in a local
Enterprise Network with DPID ‘0000000000000001’ on port 3, using isolation Vlan ID 100 and






The State-of-the-art monitoring setup requires manual effort to setup the optical taps at the net-
work device links and the corresponding IDS system, which is guaranteed to take significantly longer
to realize compared to the usage of DEIDtect.
6.6 DEIDtect Cloud IDS Detection
DEIDtect is built on the insight that traffic monitoring can be done by replicating traffic and
delivering the replicated traffic using tunneling protocols like VLAN, MPLS, or GRE. In this section
we show that the tunneled traffic can be used for monitoring using the IDS.
In this section we evaluate two cases of IDS detection: one where attack traffic is sent directly to
the IDS system and another where attack traffic is replicated using the DEIDtect framework.
6.6.1 Metrics
The metric being used is the detection in direct traffic vs DEIDtect tunneled traffic.
6.6.2 Test and Result
To test the Bro detection in a direct traffic scenario, we have setup two pc3000 nodes directly
connected in Emulab, as shown in Figure 6.7. The “attacker system” sends the below listed traffic
directly to the “Bro system”:
• Port scan
• File transfer
• TCP syn attack
The test result is successful when the detections are the same with the “direct” and the “tunneled”
traffic. This is sufficient to prove that the tunneled traffic can be used to detect anomalies.
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Figure 6.7: Bro IDS Detection Test Topology
For the tunnel traffic scenario, we use the same testbed as shown in Figure 6.2, creating a moni-
toring point in local enterprise network Switch S1 and port 3. The attacker is the Host 1 (H1) and the
destination is Host 3 (H3). Creating a monitoring point only monitors the traffic going out of port 3,
and if we want to monitor the ingress traffic, then we have to create a monitoring point in Switch S2
and port 1. In this experiment we monitored the outgoing traffic at S1 and port 3.
Table 6.1 shows the tests performed on each setup, and their results. The result shows that the
tunneled traffic can be used for detecting the anomalies using IDS.
6.7 Mininet - CPqD User Space Switch Benchmark
To establish a baseline in this section we show the base performance of the CPqD switch used in
the mininet environment for Enterprise Network Environment.
6.7.1 Metrics
The metric being used is the traffic throughput achieved at different traffic rates when using VLAN
actions.
6.7.2 Test and Result
The experiment is performed in the simple test topology, which has Host 1 (H1) connected to
Switch 1 (S1) connected to Host 2 (H2) via Switch 2 (S2), shown in Figure 6.8.
Table 6.1: Bro Detection Results
S.No Test
Detection Result
Bro System Bro IDS VM
1 Port Scan Yes Yes
2 FTP Yes Yes






Figure 6.8: CpQD Benchmark Topology
UDP traffic is generated from Host 1 (H1) to Host 2 (H2). The flows from H1 to H2 in Switch 1
(S1) and Switch 2 (S2) are manually configured to add VLAN 100 at S1 for all the traffic from H1,
S2 pops the VLAN tag and forwards to H2. The flow rules for each switch are shown below.
[Switch 1] dpctl unix:/tmp/s1 flow-mod cmd=add,table=0 in_port=1
apply:push_vlan=0x8100,set_field=vlan_vid:100,output=2
[Switch 2] dpctl unix:/tmp/s2 flow-mod cmd=add,table=0 vlan_vid=100
apply:pop_vlan,output=2
Figures 6.9 and 6.10 show the throughput achieved at different traffic rates. The destination shows
a slightly higher traffic rate, which is the effect of adding VLAN header on top of it. The results show
that the CPqD user switch performs well for traffic rates up to 4 Mbps, after that the throughput is
unpredictable, with many drops and the maximum output to be approximately 5.5 Mbps, even at 8
Mbps of input traffic.
From the experiment, the CPqD user switch operating range in the given topology without traffic
rate loss is up to 4 Mbps. This will be the range used for the rest of the experiments.
6.8 Bandwidth Management for Tap Traffic
In this section we evaluate ALB rate-limiting of DEIDtect framework. The rate-limiting is a
dynamically controlled sliding window-like mechanism to allow service traffic to be minimally im-
pacted by tap traffic. This evaluation shows how the tap traffic is getting rate-limited to different rates
compared to the current service traffic rates, which reside in the same path of the tap traffic. Though
the networks are usually overprovisioned to accomodate higher rates of traffic than expected, using
DEIDtect in such networks makes good use of the available bandwidth for traffic monitoring. This is
done in a more controlled way by the DEIDtect ALB rate-limiting feature.
6.8.1 Metrics

































































































































































































(f) Destination Traffic @ 5 Mpbs
Figure 6.9: (i) CPQD - Performance Results
6.8.2 Test and Result
The experiment is performed in the testbed shown in Figure 6.2 marked as Local Site. The
DEIDtect Local Site’s Enterprise Network is configured with switch S3’s port 2 as its gateway port,
which is connected to the Cloud environment of DEIDtect.
The Enterprise network is emulated using Mininet. The experiment creates a minimal number of
hosts and switches to demonstrate the framework’s capability.
UDP traffic is sent from Host 1 (H1) to Host 3 (H3), and a monitoring tap is installed at switch

































































































































































































(f) Destination Traffic @ 8 Mpbs
Figure 6.10: (ii) CPQD - Performance Results
S1’s output port 3 towards the gateway. This scenario creates both service traffic and tap traffic in the
switch S1 port 3. The tap traffic has to be regulated by the ALB rate-limiting feature of DEIDtect to
reduce or increase depending upon the increase and decrease of service traffic.
Figure 6.11 shows the source service traffic graph in the first column, and destination service
traffic graph delivered at the destination Host H3 in the second column of the graph, and the corre-
sponding tap traffic graph delivered at the gateway port, which is switch S3 port 2, in the last column.
The traffic rates used to evaluate are 1, 2, and 3 Mbps of service traffic sent from H1 to H3.







































































































































































































(i) Tap Traffic @ 3 Mpbs
Figure 6.11: DEIDtect ALB - rate limiting
both service and tap traffic, and decreases rapidly in case of service traffic disruption for each of the
traffic rates. This shows that DEIDtect regulates the tap traffic as designed to keep the service traffic
disruption as minimal as possible.
The tap traffic graph shows a number of spiked drops. These are the points where the rate-limit is
being updated. The rate-limit update to the metering table causes this drop, which is a function of the
switch implementation.
6.9 DEIDtect granularity of tap
This evaluation shows that the monitoring tap can be created for specific type of traffic in DEID-
tect against state-of-the-art systems that capture all traffic being monitored.
6.9.1 Test and Result
The experiment is performed in the testbed shown in Figure 6.2 marked as Local Site. The
DEIDtect Local Site’s Enterprise Network configured with switch S3’s port 2 as its gateway port,
which is connected to the Cloud environment of DEIDtect.
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TCP traffic is sent from Host 1 (H1) to Host 3 (H3) @ 2 Mbps throughout the experiment, TCP
traffic is sent from Host 2 (H2) to H3 @ 8 Mbps for 120 seconds. A monitoring tap is installed at
switch S2’s output port 2 at 20th second of the traffic generation.
Figure 6.12 shows the tap traffic in case of TCP filtering. From the graph it can be seen that
once the TCP source stops sending traffic at 120s, the tap traffic also stops, hence illustrating that the
monitoring tap is only for TCP traffic. This shows how the ALB Rate-Limiting is applied on the tap
traffic.
Figure 6.13 shows the tap traffic in case of UDP filtering. As the UDP traffic is sent throughout,
the tap traffic is seen throughout, even after the TCP source has stopped, illustrating that the monitor-
ing tap is only for UDP traffic. As before, this shows how the ALB Rate-Limiting is applied on the
tap traffic.
The results show the granularity of the DEIDtect framework.
6.10 Whitelisting for Tap Traffic
This evaluation is to show the effect of ALB-Whitelisting on the tap traffic, and to show how it
helps deliver traffic of interest to the IDS against traffic which is not necessary for the IDS which is
classified as normal traffic.
6.10.1 Test and Result
The experiment is performed in the testbed shown in Figure 6.2 marked as Local Site. The
monitoring tap is created in switch S2 to monitor traffic towards port 2 in Figure 6.2 in the local
enterprise site. In this experiment the IDS VM has already been created to detect the Whitelisting
traffic.
Figure 6.14 shows TCP traffic is sent from H1 to H3 @ 2 Mbps throughout the experiment, and
at “event 1” an FTP get request is sent from H1 to H3. TCP traffic is sent from H2 to H3 @ 2 Mbps
for 60 seconds of the experiment. Host H3 hosts a secure FTP server. The monitoring point is created
at 20 seconds to tunnel the traffic towards the existing IDS VM.
The IDS VM issues a Whitelisting request in the event of a successful file transfer. Once this
request is sent to DEIDtect Core, it is relayed to the corresponding Enterprise DEIDtect Network
System and pushes the corresponding drop rules of the specified traffic.
Figure 6.14 shows the traffic delivery at each of the monitoring ports. Figure 6.14 (d) shows the
whitelist window for traffic from H1 to H3 because of the “event 1.” Hence the traffic between H1
and H3 is not seen in the gateway. This is illustrated, as the H2 traffic generation has been stopped at
60 seconds. The whitelist drops the traffic for 60 seconds as per the current implementation, and after

























































































(d) Tap Traffic - TCP filter
Figure 6.12: DEIDtect - TCP Tap
Thus ALB-Whitelisting plays an important role in regulating the traffic towards the IDS in a smart
way in cases where there are many monitoring points which share the same link giving way for the
tap traffic which the IDS wants to analyze.
6.11 DEIDtect ALB - IDS scaling
In this section we evaluate ALB - IDS scaling framework. Scaling happens when the current
configuration of the IDS is not able to handle the load which is directly proportional to the CPU load
on that VM. In such a scenario DEIDtect is able to scale the IDS VM to handle the load.
We will evaluate the scaling of IDS based upon the IDS VM usage. Depending on the amount of
traffic being diverted to the IDS, the CPU usage will vary, and this is used to evaluate how the scaling
occurs in these cases.
As mentioned before, the network topology information is not available in the current OpenStack
version. Hence the flow distribution using network topology placement to make the necessary cluster
arrangement as in Bro Cluster Topology Setup [4] is not possible. For the current implementation


























































































(d) Tap Traffic - UDP filter
Figure 6.13: DEIDtect - UDP Tap
This is done using Linux PF RING, which is a means of distributing packets from the NIC
to multiple applications simultaneously. By having multiple workers in each thread in a multicore
system, a Bro Host-based cluster can be configured to handle high rate of traffic.
We will only evaluate the CPU usage, as the packets processing has already been studied for the
cluster-based setup by Weaver in Stress Testing Cluster Bro [31].
6.11.1 Metrics
The metrics analyzed is the IDS VM CPU usage between Standalone and Cluster mode.
6.11.2 Test and Result
The IDS VM created by DEIDtect will be reporting the CPU usage periodically to the DEIDtect
framework. Based upon this usage, DEIDtect will request the DEIDtect Cloud System to scale the
IDS. But with the current limitation of the unavailability of the physical network topology informa-
tion, DEIDtect requests the IDS itself to move from standalone to cluster mode. The cluster mode
will be running a manager, a proxy and four workers pinned to each of the cores of the IDS VM. The


























































































(d) Tap Traffic - whitelist H1 to H3
Figure 6.14: DEIDtect - ALB Whitelist
Figure 6.15 shows the CPU usage over the span of the experiment. With the mininet environment,
we could not saturate the link to the IDS VM, hence for testing we simulated an event trigger where
the VM is made to report a higher CPU usage against the actual CPU. Figure 6.15 “Event 1” shows
the transition from standalone to cluster mode, where all the cores become active to handle more
traffic load. The packet handling is not studied for the same reason mentioned above, but this has
been studied and published by Weaver in Stress Testing Cluster Bro [31].
From the results we can see that DEIDtect ALB - IDS scaling works as claimed.
6.12 Data Loss in IDS
DEIDtect regulates the tap traffic by Adaptive Load Balancing which comprises two ways of
limiting. Rate-limiting is a blind rate limit of packets based upon the service traffic rate at each
monitoring port. These packets are dropped by the switch based upon the firmware implementation.
DEIDtect has no control of how these are dropped, while Whitelisting drops flows which are classified
as normal traffic by the IDS.
In this section, we analyze the effect of packet loss of the tap traffic being made by the rate-limiter






































































Figure 6.15: DEIDtect IDS Scaling Cpu Usage
The experiment is performed in the testbed shown in Figure 6.16 marked as Local Site. The
PCAP file should be real-time enterprise traffic. Since http://digitalcorpora.org packet traces offer
such traces over weeks, we will be using once such small trace for our experiment.
6.12.1 Test and Result
Figure 6.16 comprises labeled points (a) TCP traffic from H1 to H3 @ 2 Mbps, (b) PCAP replay
traffic from http://digitalcorpora.org/corpora/scenarios/2009-m57-patents/net/net-2009-11-14-09:24.
pcap.gz sent towards H3 @ 1 Mbps, (c) Destination port and the Tap port in a 4 Mbps link, and (d)
Tap traffic for the corresponding Tap (Max Tap traffic rate configured @ 2 Mbps).
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Figure 6.16: DEIDtect Tap Traffic Packet Loss Topology
All the traffic activity graphs shown will show the traffic activity at each of the labeled points.
The traffic activity graph has event labels in it. Event: (1) TCP traffic sent from H1 to H3, (2)
TAP installed in Switch 2 port 2 Figure 6.16 (c), and (3) PCAP replay traffic from H2 to H3. The
label WhiteStart and WhiteEnd shows the time-line event where the TCP traffic from H1 to H3 is
Whitelisted by DEIDtect.
The final packet capture is done only for traffic other than between H1 to H3, which is the PCAP
traffic being replayed. The trace-summary given based upon the packet capture at the IDS is obtained
to analyze the effect of packet loss in IDS detection. The PCAP traffic source is started well after
DEIDtect ALB-Rate-limiting has warmed up to its maximum rate-limiting state.
6.12.1.1 Ground Truth Detection Results
For the ground truth about the detection, we capture the PCAP traffic without data loss in the
IDS for the same topology. Figure 6.17 shows a number of time-series events corresponding to IDS
detection: (1) No TCP traffic is sent, (2) Create Tap point on S2 port 2, (3) play PCAP file. The
resulting traffic activity is shown in Figure 6.17. The IDS host was able to receive 628 packets from
the PCAP trace.
Without any data loss to the tap traffic, the respective trace summary which consists of number of
source and destination IP detected, is shown in Table 6.2. This serves as the baseline for the evaluation
of DEIDtect with and without Whitelisting in terms of detection on account of traffic loss.
6.12.1.2 DEIDtect Nonwhitelist - Detection Results
Without any Whitelisting for the same experimental setup, IDS captures the traffic from H2 alone
which is the PCAP replay traffic. Figure 6.18 shows a number of time-series events corresponding to














(a) TCP Source Traﬃc Activity
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(d) Enterprise Network Gateway Traﬃc Activity





Figure 6.17: Ground Truth - IDS Detection Traffic Graph
(3) play PCAP file. The resulting traffic activity is shown in Figure 6.18. The IDS host was able to
receive 446 packets from the PCAP trace.
The graph shows that once all the traffic sources start sending traffic, a total of 3 Mbps of traffic
is being sent to H3, but the Tap traffic is capped at 2 Mbps from the 4 Mbps link, hence 1 Mbps of
traffic is lost. This loss causes the PCAP replay traffic packet capture in the IDS to be less accurate.
As shown in Table 6.3, IDS VM was able to detect only a few connections from the PCAP trace.
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Table 6.2: Ground Truth Result -Trace Summary









6.12.1.3 DEIDtect Whitelist - Detection Results
For the same experimental setup, in the Whitelisting period which drops traffic from H1 to H3 to
be discarded in the tap, traffic is shown in Figure 6.19. The IDS host was able to receive 585 packets
from the PCAP trace.
This results in a better detection, as shown in Table 6.4. Though this shows all the detection to
be the same as the ground truth results, this summary is obtained from the smaller number of packets
compared against the “Ground Truth,” which may lead to detection degradation if any packet loss is
incurred.
This evaluation shows that ALB-Whitelisting helps in terms of IDS detection accuracy.
6.13 Summary of Results
A summary of our results is presented below.
• We show that DEIDtect is able to monitor traffic at any point of an enterprise network with
great ease in “local” and “remote” sites.
• DEIDtect is able to detect anamolies with the tunnel traffic approach with IDS in the cloud.
• DEIDtect is able to dynamically manage the Tap traffic rate with minimal disruption to service
traffic.
• DEIDtect is able to Tap specific type of traffic, giving fine-grained control of what is being
monitored.
• DEIDtect is able to drop packets in a smart way using Whitelisting.
• The combined effect of rate-limiting and Whitelisting delivers packets of interest to the IDS,
which helps detect anamolies.
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(b) PCAP Replay Source Traﬃc Activity

















(c) Destination Traﬃc Activity
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Figure 6.18: DEIDtect Nonwhitelist - IDS Detection Traffic Graph
Table 6.3: Nonwhitelist Result - Trace Summary

















(a) TCP Source Traﬃc Activity



















(b) PCAP Replay Source Traﬃc Activity
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Figure 6.19: DEIDtect Whitelist - IDS Detection Traffic Graph
Table 6.4: Whitelist Result - Trace Summary










PRACTICAL CHALLENGES AND FUTURE
WORK
7.1 Challenges
This section talks about the challenges towards the deployment of DEIDtect in the real world, and
potential future work.
7.1.1 Enterprise Network Features
The DEIDtect framework relies on OF’s multiple-flow table support for the safe tapping of the
traffic. Multiple-flow tables are being supported from OF 1.1 and up. This gives the flexibility to
extend the packet-processing pipeline to multiple levels, as opposed to the single-table support in
OpenFlow version 1.0. Multiple-flow tables give the flexibility to have fine-grained control of traffic
of interest at each level of the pipeline. Figure 2.4 shows the pipeline for two table. The flexibility of
having multiple levels of match on the pipeline is a critical requirement for DEIDtect.
We investigated an alternative way to replicate safe tapping without using multiple tables. The
group table which is supported in all OF versions was a viable solution. The group tables give the
flexibility to take multiple actions for a set of matching flows. Figure 7.1 shows this functionality for
one flow having two actions. The limitation of this approach is that it does not provide the granularity
of the multiple-flow table feature.
In Figure 2.4, if we want to have only TCP flows sent out of port 3, the corresponding pipeline
match will have the TCP match in the IDS flow table. But this is not possible in the group table
approach. All the actions operate on one copy of the packet. Despite this limitation, it is possible to
realize fine-grained safe tapping with the group table by having fine-grained flow differentiation in
the next-hop switch.
A major OF 1.0 restriction was that metering features are supported from OF 1.1 onwards, which
is crucial for ALB’s functionality. Hence DEIDtect requires OF 1.1+ as the minimum requirement
for deployment.

































Figure 7.1: Safe Tapping using Group Tables
1. Hardware Multi-Table support - if there is only software multi-table support we might as well
use software switching.
2. Meter-Table supporting Drop band type - for rate limiting of traffic.
3. Flow Table with VLAN PUSH,VLAN MOD and VLAN POP actions are crucial for isolation
enforcement.
4. Flow Table Match flexibility is required to allow targeting of specific tap traffic. As such match
fields with few constrains on usage is desirable.
7.1.2 Cloud Network Access
In a cloud environment there are many ways of deployment in different network topology settings
based upon requirements and demand. This is decided by the cloud administrators. Some cloud
softwares capable of managing the network devices, and some assume connectivity between nodes,
as in OpenStack [26].
The cloud-deployment software provides a rich programming interface to interact with the cloud
to enable third-party application development. But many of the core administration tasks are kept
isolated from external access. DEIDtect requires flow installation capability in an SDN-enabled cloud
environment to manage the tap traffic rate in the cloud network, as well. This is possible only when
we have access to the underlying network devices. And the firewall settings should be accessed by
DEIDtect, as the IDS requires all types of traffic to be delivered to it, which is most likely to set off
the firewall in the cloud to kick in, which is an undesirable effect. DEIDtect also requires some of
the configurations to be pushed to the VM, which are to be created for IDS for the Whitelisting and
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dynamic scaling. The Cloud software is required to have dynamic data injection or configuration-
management support like Cloud-init [2] or Chef [3].
7.1.3 Inter-Domain Access
The DEIDtect framework has different domains to make the whole orchestration happen, and
hence requires access to the domains by some means to control the Enterprise and the Cloud environ-
ment, as described in Section 2.
7.2 Future Work
The DEIDtect framework provides the ability to deploy a monitoring point in an enterprise or a
campus network, and functions across domains in a distributed way which opens up new use cases,
as described in Chapter 3.
We want to provide a way to make use of this framework to write applications on top of it to make
use of the interdomain distributed capability, which has never been deployed before to create new
opportunities for the security administrators.
With the knowledge about the physical network topology, the tapping can be optimized to reduce
the duplicate traffic within the network.
With DEIDtect we have more information about the traffic such as the switch in which the traffic
is originating along, with the information from the IDS detection results. This can be helpful for the
security administrator to identify the problem quickly.
CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
This thesis aims to address the challenge of ease and flexibility and scalability to the Network
Intrusion Detection deployment. We presented our work on DEIDtect architecture which exploits in-
creased cloud- and software-defined networking deployments to realize an elastic distributed intrusion
detection framework. DEIDtect effectively decouples the location of a network being protected from
the location of the security tools performing security functions. This flexibility enables DEIDtect to
realize new distributed security functions between partnered organizations. We presented the detailed
design and implementation of DEIDtect and illustrated its functionality using emulated enterprise
environment and OpenStack cloud environment. To realize the full potential of DEIDtect, our future
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